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Introduction and summary
Two central concerns of economic policy are growth
and business cycle stabilization. There is considerable
interest in devising government policies and institu-
tions to influence prospects for economic growth and
mitigate the distress associated with economic down-
turns. Proper evaluation of the benefits and costs of
a given policy proposal requires knowledge of the
determinants of growth and business cycles. This is
one reason for the considerable body of research
aimed at understanding these phenomena.
The last two decades have seen considerable
advances in this research. Recent empirical evidence,
however, brings into question two of its basic assump-
tionsfirst, that technological change is homoge-
neous in nature, in that it affects our ability to produce
all goods symmetrically, including consumption and
investment goods; and second, that business cycles
are driven by shocks which affect the demand for
investment goods.
In this article, I document the key evidence that
challenges the conventional views of growth and
business cycles. I then discuss the plausibility of alter-
native theories that have been advanced to meet the
challenge. To date, the evidence seems to support a
new view of growth and business cycles, one that is
based on technical change biased toward new invest-
ment goods like capital equipment.
The key evidence involves two observations on
the behavior of the relative price of business equip-
ment over the last 40 years. First, in almost every year
since the end of the 1950s, business equipment has
become cheaper than the previous year in terms of
its value in consumption goods. This means that if
one had to trade restaurant meals for a piece of equip-
ment that makes the same number and quality of, say,
bicycles, one would forgo fewer meals in 1998 than in
1958. Second, this relative price tends to fall the most
when the economy, and investment expenditures in
particular, are growing at relatively high rates, that is,
it is countercyclical.
The first piece of evidence is striking because it
suggests that much of post-WWII economic growth
can be attributed to technological change embodied
in new capital equipment. This conflicts with conven-
tional views on what drives economic growth. A piece
of capital equipment is a good that is used to produce
another good, such as a crane or a computer. An im-
provement in capital-embodied technology is the
invention of equipment that takes the same amount
of labor and preexisting equipment to produce as the
old equipment but that produces more goods when
combined with the same amount of labor as before.
If a new production process yields the same units of
capital equipment with less factor inputs, then this
has the same economic implications as if the capital
equipment produced were itself more efficient. Hence,
an equivalent interpretation of what constitutes
capital-embodied technical change is that it involves
an improvement in the technology that produces
capital equipment.
To understand the relationship between capital-
embodied technical change and the trend in the equip-
ment price, suppose the technology for producing
consumption goods is fixed. With improvements in
technology embodied in equipment, the supply of
(quality-adjusted) investment goods increases rela-
tive to consumption goods, so the equipment price
falls. Greenwood et al. (1997) build on this insight to
show that a large fraction of economic growth can be
attributed to capital-embodied technical change.
This conflicts with the conventional view that most36 Economic Perspectives
growth is due to disembodied technical change, or
multifactor productivity. Improvements in disembod-
ied technology, usually measured as the Solow (1957)
residual, make it possible to produce all kinds of
goods, not just capital goods, with less capital and
labor.1 If this were the dominant source of growth,
then we should not have seen such a large drop in
the price of equipment over the last 40 years.
The second piece of evidence runs counter to
standard views of the business cycle. Standard theo-
ries hold that the business cycle is driven by shocks
which affect the demand for investment goods. For
example, consider the ISLM model, which summarizes
much of what is often called Keynesian macroeconom-
ics. This model is the focus of most textbooks on mac-
roeconomics and underlies much of the discussion of
macroeconomic policy in the media.2 In this model, busi-
ness cycles are due to shocks to aggregate demand,
such as monetary and fiscal disturbances. For example,
expansionary monetary policy stimulates demand for
investment goods through lower interest rates. If there
is an upward sloping supply schedule for investment
goods, we would expect the relative price of invest-
ment goods to rise. The same holds for expansionary
fiscal policy, if government spending does not fully
crowd out investment. Another view of business
cycles, often attributed to Keynes, is that they are
primarily investment cycles driven by variation in an-
imal spirits, that is, changes in confidence about fu-
ture growth prospects.3 With the same assumptions on
investment supply, we would expect investment prices
to be high when investment is high. In summary, tra-
ditional Keynesian views of business cycles imply
that investment good prices should be procyclical,
that is, be high when overall economic activity is
relatively high.
In recent years, an alternative view of business
cycles, based on fundamentals that influence aggre-
gate supply, has gained credence. This real business
cycle view says that business cycles are driven in
large part by disturbances to multifactor productivity.
Just as the shocks to aggregate demand which are
central to Keynesian theories, these disturbances
influence business cycles through their effect on the
demand for investment goods.4 Hence, if there are
costs in terms of forgone consumption of expanding
investment good production, that is, if the supply
schedule of capital is upward sloping, these models
also predict the relative price of investment goods to
be procyclical (Greenwood and Hercowitz, 1988).
Since the relative price evidence contradicts the
major schools of business cycle thought, it poses a
challenge to our understanding of business cycles.
There are two leading hypotheses that could reconcile
the theory and evidence. One, the embodied technol-
ogy view, is built from the real business cycle tradition
and takes into account the trend evidence on equip-
ment prices. Falling equipment prices are compelling
evidence of capital-embodied technological progress
over long horizons. Perhaps changes in the rate of
such technological progress occur over shorter hori-
zons as well. Suppose the business cycle were driven,
to a large extent, by these disturbances. An increase in
the rate of capital-embodied technical change would
lead to an outward shift in the supply schedule for
investment goods. With stable investment demand,
investment would rise and equipment prices would
fall. This new view of business cycles, which comple-
ments the new view of growth suggested by the long-
run evidence on equipment prices, has been explored
by Christiano and Fisher (1998), Fisher (1997), and
Greenwood et al. (1998).
The other leading theory is more easily under-
stood in the context of traditional Keynesian views
of the business cycle. If shocks to aggregate demand
occur with a downward sloping investment supply
curve, then the price of equipment could fall in a boom.
A downward sloping investment supply curve would
arise if increasing returns to scale played an important
part in the production of capital equipment, so this is
called the increasing returns view. This view has been
advanced by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989).
Below, I document the trend and business cycle
evidence on equipment prices. There is no reason to
expect that capital-embodied technological change is
unique to equipment. Equipment is one of many invest-
ment good aggregates, that is, types of capital. More-
over, for simplicity most economic models assume
only one or two types of capital. Therefore, in addition
to equipment prices, I analyze other investment good
aggregates. Next, I discuss research that sheds light
on the plausibility of the alternative views, including
some new evidence. To date, the evidence seems to
support the new view of growth and business cycles
based on capital-embodied technical change.
If growth and business cycles are originating
from changes in capital-embodied technology, then
the models we use for policy analysis have to incor-
porate this and, consequently, policy recommenda-
tions could change. For example, to the extent that
technological change is embodied in capital equipment,
government policies that affect equipment investment
could have a dual impact on growth via the quality
and quantity of capital goods. This could mean, for
example, that investment tax credits directed toward
improvements in the efficiency of capital equipment
could have a significant impact on growth.37 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
The implications for stabilization policy of the em-
bodied technology view are less obvious. The fact
that it seems to supplant the increasing returns view
means that the arguments for interventionist stabili-
zation policy that this view lends support to are less
compelling. For example, increasing returns could
provide scope for policy intervention, as it either
involves externalities or is inconsistent with perfect
competition. Moreover, it makes models based on
animal spirits more plausible, which also has implica-
tions for stabilization policy (see Christiano and
Harrison, 1999). The embodied technology view is
more in line with the real business cycle tradition, in
which policy interventions are counterproductive.
Evidence on investment good prices
To study the trend and business cycle properties
of investment good prices, we need two thingsa
way to extract real prices and quantities from data on
nominal investment expenditures; and a precise defi-
nition of what we mean by the business cycle compo-
nent of the data. Below, I address these issues. Then,
I introduce the data and present the results character-
izing the trend and cycle behavior of investment
good prices.
Measuring prices and quantities
This section describes how relative prices and
real quantities of investment goods are measured. My
measures of prices and quantities are based on mea-
sures published in the National income and product
accounts (NIPA) of the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA).
The basis of the BEA procedure is to construct a
price deflator. To be concrete, a given nominal quan-
tity of expenditures on some good i, Xi
t, is decomposed
into a price deflator, P i
t, (which measures the nominal
price of the good) multiplied by a quality-adjusted
index of the real quantity of the good, q i
t.
The BEA measures P i
t and q i
t for different goods
using a so-called chain-weighting procedure, which
is summarized in box 1. My measure of quantity is
simply q i
t, measured in units of 1992 dollars. My mea-
sure of the real price, alternatively the relative price,
of good i at date t, p i
t, is the real quantity of consump-
tion goods that would need to be sold in order to pur-
chase one unit of good i at time t. It is defined as the
price deflator for good i divided by the price deflator
for consumption of nondurables and services. The
rationale for this measure is described in box 1.
Measuring the business cycle component of the data5
In the introduction I described how the price of
producer durable equipment (PDE) varies over the
business cycle. Below, I provide a brief description of
how I measure the business cycle component of the
data. A detailed discussion of the procedure is given
in Christiano and Fitzgerald (1998).
Figure 1 illustrates the basic idea behind the pro-
cedure. The colored line in panel A of figure 1 displays
real 1992 dollar chain-weighted gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP). The reported data are the logarithm of the
raw data. The advantage of using the logarithm is
that the resulting movements correspond to percent
changes in the underlying data. The deviations be-
tween the data and the trend line (graphed in panel B)
contain the rapidly varying, erratic component, inher-
ited from the choppy portion of the data that is evident
in panel A. The colored line in panel B is my measure
of the business cycle component of real GDP. This
measure excludes both the trend part of the data and
the rapidly varying, erratic component. It includes only
the component of the data that contains fluctuations
in the range of two to eight years. According to this
approach, the economy is in recession when the
business cycle measure is negative and in prosperity
when it is positive.
Figure 1 also compares this measure of the busi-
ness cycle with the one produced by the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). This organiza-
tion decides, based on an informal examination of many
data series by a panel of experts, when the economy
has reached a business cycle peak or trough. The
start of each shaded area indicates the date when,
according to the NBER, the economy reached a busi-
ness cycle peak. The end of each shaded area indi-
cates a business cycle trough. Note how real GDP falls
from peak to trough and then generally grows from
trough to peak. An obvious difference in the two busi-
ness cycle measures is that the measure used in this
article is a continuous variable, while the NBERs takes
the form of peak and trough dates. As a result, my
measure not only indicates when a recession occurs,
but also the intensity of the recession. Apart from
these differences, the two measures appear reasonably
consistent. For example, near the trough of every NBER
recession, my measure of the business cycle is always
negative. However, the two measures do not always
agree. According to my measure, the economy was in
recession in 1967 and 1987, while the NBER did not de-
clare a recession then. In part, this is because there
must be several quarters of negative GDP growth before
the NBER declares a recession. The procedure I use
only requires a temporary slowdown.
The data
I consider a broad variety of investment goods, as
outlined in table 1. The broadest measure of investment38 Economic Perspectives
is total private investment (TPI). This measure in-
cludes all private expenditures on capital goods and
consumer goods designed to last more than three
years.6 This is a broader measure of investment than
the conventional NIPA measure of investment, pri-
vate fixed investment (PFI), which excludes expendi-
tures on consumer goods. Within TPI, I define two
main components, nonresidential and residential.
Nonresidential has two main subcomponents, struc-
tures (NRS, for example, factory buildings and office
buildings) and producer durable equipment (PDE, for
example, auto-assembly robots and personal comput-
ers). Similarly, residential is broken down into residen-
tial structures and equipment (RSE, for example, single
family homes and refrigerators) and consumer
durables (CD, for example, televisions and vacuum
cleaners). These four major subcomponents of TPI are
then broken down further.7
The  Nominal share and Real share data pro-
vide information on the relative magnitudes of expen-
ditures on the different measures of investment, as
well as a preliminary indication of interesting trends
in relative prices. The nominal and real shares for TPI
are calculated as the ratio of nominal and real TPI rel-
ative to nominal and real GDP, respectively. For exam-
ple, in 1958 nominal TPI expenditures were 22 percent
of nominal GDP and real TPI expenditures were 16
percent of real GDP. The remaining shares are calcu-
lated using TPI as the base for the share calculations.
For example, PDE expenditures accounted for 24 per-
cent of nominal TPI and 20 percent of real TPI in 1958.8
BOX 1
Measuring real quantities and prices from nominal expenditure data
The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
uses the chain-type Fisher index to measure real
output and prices. For a thorough discussion of
the procedures the BEA uses, see Landefeld and
Parker (1997), which this box draws on. This index,
developed by Irving Fisher, is a geometric mean of
the conventional fixed-weighted Laspeyres index
(which uses weights of the first period in a two-
period example) and a Paassche index (which uses
the weights of the second period). The Laspeyres
price index for period t constructed using base
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 Here N is the number of goods whose prices are
being summarized by the index, Pt
i is the date t dollar
price of the ith quality-adjusted good, and qt
i is the
quality-adjusted quantity of good i purchased at
date t. The Fisher price index at date t, Ft is
FL S tt t =´ .
From this definition we see that changes in Ft
are calculated using the weights of adjacent
years. These period to period changes are
chained (multiplied) together to form a time
series that allows for the effects of changes in rel-
ative prices and in the composition of output over
time. Notice that a quantity index can be comput-
ed in a manner analogous to the price index. A nice
feature of the Fisher index is that the product of
these two indexes equals nominal expenditures.
Landefeld and Parker (1997) discuss several ad-
vantages of this index over previously used fixed
weight indexes.
To measure relative prices we need to choose
a numeraire. In the introduction the term value in
consumption goods was used. Implicit in this
statement is the assumption that consumption
goods, specifically nondurable and services con-
sumption, is the numeraire. Define the price defla-
tor for nondurable and services consumption as
Pt






















Notice that the units of the price are what we
require. The BEA does not provide a measure of
price deflator for nondurable and services consump-
tion. To construct the consumption deflator used
in this article, I applied the chain-weighting meth-
odology outlined above, treating the NIPA quantity
and price indexes for nondurable consumption
and service consumption as the prices and quanti-
ties in the formulas.39 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
(I explain the last two columns in table 1 in the section
on prices of investment goods over the business cy-
cle, which begins on page 40.)
Table 1 reveals several interesting facts about
how expenditures on investment have changed since
1958 and underlying trends in relative prices. First,
nominal TPI expenditures have been roughly stable
(abstracting from short-run movements) as a fraction
of nominal GDP since the late 1950s. Yet, the real quan-
tity of this broadest measure has been growing as a
fraction of real GDP. In 1958, TPI was 16 percent of
1992 chain-weighted GDP, compared with 26 percent
in 1998. The fact that nominal and real shares behave
in this way is an indication that the relative price of
this bundle of investment goods fell between 1958
and 1998. Notice that there are differences between
real and nominal shares for many of the
components of investment listed in table
1, suggesting that trends in relative pric-
es are exhibited by many of the subcom-
ponents of TPI. Second, the difference
between the real shares of TPI and PFI
(the former is a fraction of GDP, while the
latter is a fraction of the former) is seen
to be due to the increasing quantities of
consumer durables being purchased.
Third, the much talked about informa-
tion age manifests itself here as the
huge increase in the fraction of TPI that
has been due to expenditures on informa-
tion and related equipment since 1960. In
1960 this type of investment accounted
for less than 1 percent of real TPI. By
1995, its share had grown to 13 percent.
Finally, note that both residential and
nonresidential structures account for
less of TPI in 1998 than in 1958.
Trends in investment good prices
In this section, I explain two main
findings relating to the long-run behavior
of relative prices for the various compo-
nents of investment listed in table 1. First,
the relative price of TPI has fallen consis-
tently since the mid-1950s. Second, there
is considerable heterogeneity in the long-
run behavior of the prices of the subcom-
ponents of TPI. Generally, the behavior
of the price of TPI is dominated by dra-
matic drops in the prices of PDE and CD,
which are also evident in the prices of most
of the main subcomponents of these in-
vestment aggregates. The prices of RSE
and NRS and their subcomponents, while exhibiting
trends over subsamples of the period studied, have
not fallen as consistently and their changes over time
are much smaller than those of PDE and CD.
Figure 2 displays the relative price trend evidence.
The black lines in figure 2 are measures of the (natural
logarithm of the) relative price of each of the invest-
ment components listed in table 1 over the period for
which data are available.9 The colored lines are the
trends calculated in the same way as the trend of real
GDP displayed in figure 1. The first column of panels
in figure 2 displays prices and trend lines for the main
aggregates. The remaining columns display prices
and trends for the four broad categories of TPI and
their main subcomponents.
Figure 2 shows that the relative prices of differ-
ent components of investment have behaved quite
FIGURE 1
The trend and business cycle components of real GDP
logarithm











Notes: Real GDP in panel A is real 1992 dollar chain-weighted GDP .
The reported data are the logarithm of the real data. Shaded areas
indicate recessions as determined by the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Source: Author’s calculations from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Economic Analysis, “National income and product accounts,” Survey of
Current Business, extracted from DRI Basic Economics database, 1947–98.
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differently in the postwar era. The price of the broadest
investment measure, TPI, has been falling consistently
since the early 1950s. Since the plot of the relative
price of TPI is in natural logarithms, one can take the
difference between the prices for two years to calcu-
late the percentage change. This procedure indicates
that the price of TPI in terms of consumption goods
fell about 42 percent between 1958 and 1998.
Studying the other plots in figure 2, we see that
this large drop in the price of TPI can be attributed to
strong downward trends in PDE (particularly informa-
tion and related and transportation equipment) and
CD (all three types). The drop in the relative price of
information equipment is particularly dramatic, at almost
200 percent since 1961. The prices of NRS and its com-
ponents were generally rising until the late 1970s, were
falling for most of the rest of the sample period, and
have started to rise again in the 1990s. RSE and its
components display a similar pattern. Generally, the
long-run changes in structures prices have been much
smaller than in PDE and CD prices. When the invest-
ment components are aggregated into nonresidential
and residential, the strong downward trends in PDE
and CD prices dominate the changing trends in
structures.10
Prices of investment goods over the business cycle
My objective here is to determine the extent to
which investment good prices are generally procyclical,
countercyclical, or acyclical (do not display any dis-
tinctive pattern over the business cycle). I find that,
generally speaking, prices of PDE, NRS, and their com-
ponents are countercyclical, prices of RSE and its
components are procyclical, and prices of CD and its
components are acyclical. There is some sample period
sensitivity, as outlined below.
In table 1, the column headed s  qi/s  qy
 indicates
the relative volatility of the different  investment com-
ponents over the business cycle. This is the standard
deviation of the business cycle component of the in-
dicated real quantity series divided by the standard
deviation of the business cycle component of real
GDP. We see that TPI varies almost three times as
much as GDP. The most volatile components of
TABLE 1
Measures of investment used in the analysis
Business cycle
Nominal share Real share volatility
1958 1978 1998 1958 1978 1998 sq i/ sqy  s p i/ sq y
Total private investment 0.2184 0.2641 0.2378 0.1558 0.2154 0.2627 2.97 0.55
Nonresidential 0.4165 0.4496 0.4656 0.4254 0.4356 0.4815 2.83 0.98
Structures 0.1730 0.1510 0.1226 0.2613 0.1674 0.1032 2.66 0.90






Mining exploration, shafts, & wells 0.0233 0.0255 0.0115 0.0302a 0.0207 0.0089 5.49 3.19
Producer durable equipment 0.2438 0.2985 0.3430 0.1981 0.2676 0.3841 3.18 0.85
Information & related 0.0355 0.0690 0.1153 0.0080c 0.0327 0.1300b 3.05 0.95
Industrial 0.0796 0.0783 0.0734 0.1134
c 0.0958 0.0747
b 3.63 0.91
Transportation & related 0.0598 0.0782 0.0871 0.0797c 0.0900 0.0762b 5.25 0.63
Residential 0.5830 0.5504 0.5344 0.5730 0.5646 0.5200 3.98 0.43
Residential structures & equipment 0.2188 0.2175 0.1782 0.3259 0.2526 0.1546 6.24 0.57
Single family structures 0.1289 0.1203 0.0897 0.2118
a 0.1350 0.0754 8.89 0.81
Multifamily structures 0.0228 0.0212 0.0122 0.0406a 0.0257 0.0109 10.80 0.81
Other structures 0.0627 0.0715 0.0721 0.1028
a 0.0860 0.0645 3.18 0.34
Consumer durables 0.3643 0.3329 0.3562 0.2835 0.3184 0.3663 2.99 0.61
Motor  vehicles & parts 0.1453 0.1539 0.1414 0.1361 0.1629 0.1290 5.16 0.94
Furniture & household equipment 0.1659 0.1223 0.1443 0.0918 0.0933 0.1717 1.94 0.54
Other 0.0534 0.0567 0.0705 0.0551 0.0670 0.0697 1.52 0.59




Notes: See box 1 for a description of the notation. For total private investment and gross domestic product, Y, nominal shares









Real shares for total private investment and gross domestic product are qTPI
t /qY
t. Real shares for investment good i in the other
rows are given by q i
t/qTPI
t .
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1947–98, “National income and product accounts,”


































 Trends in investment good prices, 194798 (logarithm)
A. Total private investment E. Nonresidential structures I. Durable equipment M. Residential structures Q. Consumer durables
B. Private fixed investment F. Nonresidential buildings J. Information N. Single family R. Motor vehicles
C. Nonresidential G. Utilities K. Industrial O. Multifamily S. Furniture
D. Residential H. Mining L. Transportation P. Other structures T. Other
Notes: Relative price (black line) is a measure of the (natural logarithm of the) relative price of each of the investment components listed in table 1 over the period for which data
are available. The trend (colored line) is calculated in the same way as the trend of real GDP displayed in figure 1. Panels A through D show prices and trends for the main
aggregates. Panels E through T show prices and trends for the four broad categories of total private investment, along with their main subcomponents.
Source: See figure 1.42 Economic Perspectives
investment are single family structures, multifamily
structures, and consumer expenditures on motor vehi-
cles and parts. The least volatile components are
NRS, furniture and household equipment, and the
other component of CD. The column headed s  pi/s q y
indicates the relative volatility of the prices of differ-
ent investment components over the business cycle.
This is the standard deviation of the business cycle
component of the indicated relative price series divid-
ed by the standard deviation of the business cycle
component of real GDP. The prices are much less vola-
tile than the quantities. With one exception (mining ex-
ploration, shafts, and wells), all the prices are less
volatile than real GDP over the business cycle.
As a preliminary look at the cyclicality of invest-
ment good prices, figure 3 displays the business cycle
components of the prices (colored lines) and quanti-
ties (black lines) of seven of the broadest measures
listed in table 1, along with the business cycle compo-
nent of the deflator for consumption of nondurables
and services. The latter price is used in the denomi-
nator of all the investment relative prices, so its busi-
ness cycle dynamics will influence all the relative
price measures discussed here.11
Notice first that the consumption deflator rises in
all but one recession, 1981:Q382:Q4 (see shaded areas
in figure 3). This is a force for procyclicality of invest-
ment good prices. For example, if the price deflator for
an investment good were constant, then the real price
of that good would be procyclical. As expected, the
quantities are generally procyclical, although the peaks
and troughs do not exactly coincide with the NBER
dates. The prices do not display as consistent a pat-
tern as the quantities. For example, sometimes the
price of TPI moves with the quantity of TPI (1950s,
1960s, and 1990s) and sometimes it moves in the oppo-
site direction (1970s and 1980s). More distinct patterns
emerge when TPI is decomposed into nonresidential
and residential. In the 1950s and 1990s, the prices and
quantities of nonresidential appear to move closely
together. In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, prices and
quantities of this investment measure generally move
in opposite directions. Prices and quantities of resi-
dential show more evidence of moving together. The
most striking pattern to emerge among the subcom-
ponents of nonresidential and residential is in PDE.
With the exception of the 1950s, almost every time the
quantity of PDE moves up, the price of PDE moves
down. This suggests countercyclical behavior in the
real price of PDE.
For a more formal examination of how the prices
of investment goods vary with the business cycle,
I use a cross-correlogram. A cross-correlogram is a
diagrammatic device for describing how two variables
are related dynamically. For example, it provides a mea-
sure of whether, say, movements in one variable tend
to occur at the same time and in the same direction as
movements in another variable. It can also be used to
measure whether, for example, positive movements in
a variable tend to occur several quarters ahead of posi-
tive movements in another variable.
The basis for the cross-correlogram is the corre-
lation coefficient, or correlation. A correlation is a mea-
sure of the degree to which two variables move together
and always takes on values between 1 and 1. If a cor-
relation is positive, then the two variables are said to
be positively correlated. Similarly, if a correlation is
negative, the variables are said to be negatively cor-
related. Larger absolute values in a correlation indicate
a stronger pattern of moving together. A correlation
for two variables measured contemporaneously is a
measure of how much two variables move together at
the same time. A correlation can be computed for two
variables measured at different times. For example,
we can measure the correlation between variable x at
time t and variable y at time t  k, where k is a positive
integer. This would measure the degree to which vari-
ations in y occur before movements in x. A cross-corre-
logram plots these correlations for various values of k.
Figure 4 displays cross-correlograms (along with
a two-standard-deviation confidence interval, a mea-
sure of how precisely the correlations are estimated)
for various business cycle components of real invest-
ment and GDP, 6 £  k  £  6. For example, panel A of
figure 4 displays the correlations of real nonresidential
investment at date t and real GDP at date t  k for the
various values of k. The fact that the correlation for
k = 0 is positive and close to 1 for all the plots in fig-
ure 4 shows that all the components of investment
displayed are strongly positively correlated with GDP
contemporaneously. This confirms the impression
given by figure 3 that real expenditures on these invest-
ment goods are strongly procyclical. Notice that the
largest correlations for nonresidential and its two main
subcomponents, NRS and PDE, are for k > 0. This says
that these components of investment tend to lag GDP
over the business cycle. Another way of saying this
is that movements above trend in GDP tend to occur
before movements above trend in these measures of
investment. On the other hand, the largest correlations
for residential and its main subcomponents, RSE and
CD, are all for k < 0. This says that these components
of investment lead output over the business cycle.
Because the correlations in figure 4 are mostly positive,
this figure shows that the main components of invest-
ment are generally procyclical. (If they had been mostly43 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIGURE 3
logarithm
Business cycle components of investment good prices and quantities
A. Consumption deflator
logarithm





Notes: Each business cycle component has been scaled by its standard deviation, and all data are quarterly.
The colored lines represent the business cycle component of the price series for the indicated variable and the black lines
represent the business cycle component of the quantity series for the indicated variable. Shaded areas indicate recessions
as determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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negative, then this would have been evidence of coun-
tercyclicality. If the correlations were mostly close to
zero, this would have been evidence of acyclicality.)
Figure 5 displays cross-correlograms (with stan-
dard errors) for the prices of the broadest measures
of investment and real GDP. The plots in figure 3 indi-
cate that there may be some sample period sensitivity
in the estimation of the underlying correlations, so
figure 5 displays cross-correlograms based on two
sample periods. The first column of panels in figure 5
is based on the sample period 1947:Q198:Q3 and the
second column is based on 1959:Q198:Q3. Notice
that none of the correlations for the TPI price based
on the longer sample are significantly different from
zero. This means that the price of the broadest mea-
sure of investment is essentially acyclical. There is
some evidence of countercyclical movements in this
price for the shorter sample, although the correlations
in this case are generally not very large in absolute
value or statistically significant.
The cyclical behavior of prices for the narrower
investment aggregates displayed in figure 5 reveals
FIGURE 4
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Note: Black lines are point estimates of correlations for the indicated series;
colored lines are a two-standard-error confidence band.
Source: See figure 1.
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that the lack of any distinct cyclical pattern for the
price of TPI masks interesting differences between
the prices of nonresidential and residential goods.
Over the longer sample, the nonresidential price is es-
timated to be essentially acyclical, but the residential
price is clearly procyclical. Over the shorter sample
the nonresidential investment price is clearly counter-
cyclical and the residential price remains procyclical.
The difference in the estimated cross-correlogram for
nonresidential over the two sample periods turns out
to be due to differences in the behavior of the price
of PDE in the 1950s compared with the later sample
period (see figure 3).
The evidence in figure 5 suggests two things.
First, the cyclical behavior of investment good prices
depends to some extent on the sample period exam-
ined. Second, considering a broad investment aggregate
masks potentially interesting cyclical characteristics of
more narrowly defined investment good prices. Figures
6 and 7 try to uncover whether the cyclical behavior
of nonresidential and residential prices also masks
different cyclical behavior among the subcomponents
FIGURE 5
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Sample period: 194798 Sample period: 19599846 Economic Perspectives
of these broad investment aggregates. These figures
display priceoutput cross-correlograms for the main
subcomponents of nonresidential and residential. Due
to data availability, the sample period for estimating
the correlations is 1959:Q198:Q3.
The first column in figure 6 pertains to NRS and
its main subcomponents, nonresidential buildings,
utilities, and mining. The price of NRS is significantly
countercyclical. This appears to be mainly driven by
the price of utilities and mining. The second column
of figure 6 pertains to PDE and its main subcomponents,
information and related equipment, industrial equip-
ment, and transportation equipment. There are two
observations to make here. First, the price of PDE is
strongly and significantly countercyclical. The con-
temporaneous (k = 0) correlation is 0.63 with a stan-
dard error of 0.03. The largest correlation in absolute
value is for k = 2, indicating that this price lags output
by about two quarters, about the same as the quantity
of PDE (see figure 4). The second observation is that
the prices of the main components of PDE behave al-
most identically: They are strongly and significantly
negatively correlated with output and lag output by
about two quarters. The behavior of the industrial
equipment price is particularly striking, given that the
long-run behavior of this price is so different from that
of the other two subcomponents of PDE (see figure 2).
Figure 7 is constructed similarly to figure 6, with
RSE and its subcomponents in the first column and
CD and its subcomponents in the second column.
This figure shows that prices of RSE are generally
procyclical and prices of CD goods are mostly acycli-
cal. The behavior of RSE is driven mostly by the cycli-
cality of single and multifamily structures. Interestingly,
despite the fact that investment in RSE tends to lead
output over the business cycle, the real price of RSE
and its components lags output. The real price of CD
is driven mostly by motor vehicles and other. Of the
subcomponents of CD, only the furniture price dis-
plays significant countercyclicality.
Summary of the evidence
The key features of the evidence presented in
this section can be summarized as follows. First, there
is strong evidence of a downward trend in the price
of investment goods in terms of consumption goods.
This downward trend is concentrated among compo-
nents of PDE and CD. Second, the broadest category
of investment, TPI, displays little distinct cyclical
variation over the sample period 1947:Q198:Q3, but
is moderately countercyclical in the later period,
1959:Q198:Q3. If we are willing to abstract from the
1950s, say because of the dominating influence of the
Korean war, then it seems reasonable to say that the
price of the broadest component of investment is
weakly countercyclical. Certainly it is difficult to make
the case that this price is procyclical, regardless of the
sample period considered.
Many components of TPI display distinct cyclical
characteristics, even if we include the 1950s. The prices
of the two main components, nonresidential and resi-
dential, behave differently. The former is significantly
countercyclical and the latter is significantly procycli-
cal. The behavior of the nonresidential price is domi-
nated by the PDE price. The PDE price is strongly
countercyclical, as are the prices of all its subcompo-
nents. The price of NRS is mildly countercyclical, but
this pattern is not shared by all its subcomponents.
The behavior of the residential price is dominated by
RSE prices, which are strongly procyclical. CD prices
are acyclical or weakly countercyclical.
Implications for growth and the
business cycle
How does the trend and cycle behavior of invest-
ment goods prices presented above challenge con-
ventional views about growth and business cycles?
Next, I discuss various attempts to reconcile theory
with the evidence and some empirical work that sheds
light on the plausibility of competing theories.
Growth theory
Recent years have seen an explosion of theoreti-
cal and empirical research into economic growth.12 On
the theoretical side, two leading classes of models of
the determinants of economic growth have emerged.
The first is based on the accumulation of human
capital and follows from the work of Lucas (1988).
Human capital consists of the abilities, skills, and
knowledge of particular workers. The basic idea behind
this view of economic growth is that it is fundamen-
tally based on improvements in the stock of human
capital of workers over time. This view of growth holds
that, other things being equal, the larger is the stock
of human capital of workers, the more productive they
are. This means that one expects an improvement in
the stock of human capital to increase the amount
of output of any good that can be produced for a
fixed quantity of workers and capital. In this sense,
growth due to the accumulation of human capital
has a homogeneous impact on the economys ability
to produce goods.
The second leading class of models focuses on
research and development. Pioneering work along
these lines includes Romer (1990), Grossman and
Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992). One
of the key insights of this literature is that growth can
emerge if there are nondecreasing returns to produced47 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIGURE 6
correlation
Business cycle correlations between nonresidential prices (t) and output (tk)
A. Nonresidential structures
correlation





Note: Black lines are point estimates of correlations for the indicated series; colored lines are a two-standard-error confidence band.




















B. Single family structures
correlation
F. Motor vehicles
Note: Black lines are point estimates of correlations for the indicated series; colored lines are a two-standard-error confidence band.












kk49 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
factors of production (such as knowledge or capital,
but not labor).13 The bottom line of this theory is sim-
ilar to that of the human capital models. Improvements
in technology due to research and development usually
increase the productivity of all factors of production.
Consequently, if there is such an improvement in
technology, more of all goods can be produced with
a fixed quantity of capital and labor. Again, techno-
logical change is assumed to have a homogeneous
impact on produced goods.
The evidence on trends in investment good prices,
particularly the trend in the price of PDE, challenges
these views of growth, because it strongly suggests
that there have been substantial improvements in tech-
nology that have affected one kind of good but not
another. Specifically, the data suggest that the quality
and technology of capital goods production have
advanced almost nonstop since the end of World
War II. Why do the data suggest this? Assuming
that the prices and quantities of PDE are correctly
measured, the real price of PDE measures how many
(constant quality) consumption goods need to be
sold in order to raise the funds to purchase one (con-
stant quality) unit of PDE. If this price has been fall-
ing, then fewer and fewer consumption goods are
needed to buy a unit of PDE. This suggests that the
supply of PDE has grown relative to the supply of
consumption goods. One way the supply of PDE can
rise in this way is if the technology for producing
capital goods improves at a faster rate than that for
producing consumption goods. In this case, the same
amount of capital and labor applied to producing PDE
or consumption goods will yield more PDE than con-
sumption as time passes. That is, the supply of PDE
will grow relative to consumption goods. The basic
logic of supply and demand then dictates that the
price of PDE in terms of consumption goods must fall.
Greenwood et al. (1997) build on this intuition to
show how the trend in the relative price of PDE and
the associated increase in the share of PDE in aggre-
gate output (see table 1) can be accounted for in a
growth model in which most growth is due to capital-
embodied technical change. In addition, the authors
argue that other potential explanations for the price
and quantity trends are implausible or boil down to
essentially the same explanation.14
Greenwood et al. (1997) apply their model of
growth to reevaluate conventional estimates of the
importance of technological change in improving
standards of living. This line of research is called
growth accounting. The effects of technical change
using standard models, like the ones briefly described
above, can be summarized by multifactor productivity,
which is also called the Solow residual. Multifactor
productivity is an index of the quantity of aggregate
output that can be produced using a fixed quantity of
(quality-adjusted) capital and labor. The higher the
multifactor productivity, the more output can be pro-
duced. Traditionally, most of growth is viewed as be-
ing due to improvements in multifactor productivity.
Greenwood et al. (1997)  use their model to show that
approximately 60 percent of all improvements in pro-
ductivity can be attributed to capital-embodied tech-
nical change, while the multifactor productivity index
accounts for the rest. This says that capital-embodied
technical change is a fundamental part of growth.
Business cycle theory
To assess the cyclical evidence on relative prices,
we need to understand how various shocks to the
economy might influence the cost of investment goods
compared with consumption goods. Figure 8 displays
a production possibilities frontier (PPF) for consump-
tion and investment goods. The PPF depicts the vari-
ous quantities of consumption and investment goods
that can be produced if capital and labor are fully
employed and used efficiently. The shape of the fron-
tier reflects the fact that, holding fixed the quantity of
labor and capital employed in producing goods, it is
costly to shift production toward either producing
more consumption goods or more investment goods.15
This is reflected in the figure by the increase in the
(absolute value of the) slope of the frontier as one
moves from the upper left to the lower right. In a com-
petitive equilibrium, the slope of the frontier equals the
relative price of the goods. Hence, as more investment
goods are produced, the relative price of investment
goods rises.
The PPF summarizes the supply side of the econ-
omy. The actual price in a competitive equilibrium is
determined by the interaction of the demand for con-
sumption and investment goods with the supply. Sup-
pose that the demand for consumption and investment
goods dictates that the quantity of consumption goods
and investment goods actually produced is given by
C0 and I0 in figure 8. Now, suppose a Keynesian de-
mand shockfor example, an increase in the money
supply which lowers interest ratesincreases the
demand for investment goods relative to consumption
goods. Since this is a demand shock, the PPF in figure
8 does not change. The change in demand leads to a
movement down the frontier, say to a point where
consumption and investment are given by C1 and I1.
Since the slope of the frontier is steeper at this point,
the relative price of investment goods must rise. If
aggregate output is driven by shocks to investment50 Economic Perspectives
demand, then the price of investment goods is predicted
to be procyclical.
An aggregate supply shock has a similar implica-
tion. The conventional assumption about these kinds
of shocks is that they raise multifactor productivity
and influence all produced goods symmetrically. This
is shown in figure 9 as a proportional shift out in the
solid line PPF to the dashed line PPF. The dashed line
PPF has been drawn so that its slope is identical to
the slope of the solid line PPF along a straight line
from the origin. This means that if the ratio of consump-
tion to investment goods produced before and after
the technology shock is constant, then the relative
price of investment goods will be unchanged. How-
ever, this is not what is predicted in standard models.
These models say that when a good technology shock
arrives, which raises the productivity of all factors of
production, the optimal response of individuals is to
smooth consumption. That is, not have consumption
change too much in the short run. The result of this
is that investment rises more than consumption. In
figure 9, this is represented by consumption and invest-
ment changing from C0 and I0 before the productivity
shock to C1 and I1 after the shock. It follows that the
price of investment goods must rise in this case as well.
Since output also rises with a positive technology
shock, the price of investment goods is predicted
to be procyclical.16
In view of the cyclical evidence presented earlier,
these model predictions are problematic. They are con-
sistent with the behavior of residential investment, but
inconsistent with the behavior of the other major com-
ponents of investment and the broadest measure, TPI.
Why are investment goods prices not procyclical?
The two leading explanations involve assumptions
about the technology for producing investment goods.
One is based on increasing returns to scale in the
production of investment goods (but not consumption
goods). The other is based on a variation in the rate
of capital-embodied technical change. The increasing
returns view assumes that the more investment goods
that are produced, the less costly it is to produce a
unit of investment goods. One way to represent this
is shown in figure 10, which displays a pseudo-PPF.17
Notice that the shape is different from figures 8 and
9. Now when more investment goods are produced
relative to consumption goods, the price of investment
goods falls. In this case, both aggregate technology
shocks and Keynesian demand shocks can lead to
countercyclical relative prices.
To understand the embodied technology view,
consider an increase in the productivity of producing
investment goods that has no direct impact on the
production of consumption goods. This could take
the form of improvements in the efficiency of produc-
ing investment goods. It could also take the form of
an improvement in the quality of investment goods
produced so that a given quantity of capital and labor
can produce a higher quantity of quality-adjusted
goods. Either way, we can represent the change in
technology as in figure 11. The improvement in tech-
nology is shown by the shift from the solid to the
dashed frontier. Along the dashed frontier, for each
quantity of consumption goods produced, more invest-
ment goods can be produced. Moreover, along any
straight line from the origin, the slope of the dashed
frontier is flatter than the solid frontier. That is, for
any fixed ratio of consumption to investment goods,
the investment goods are cheaper in terms of consump-
tion goods after the change in technology. Now, after
the increase in technology, there will be a shift in favor
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of the production of investment goods. If this shift is
strong enough, the movement along the dashed fron-
tier could in principle raise the investment good price.
In practice, this does not happen. Since aggregate
output rises after this kind of technology shock, if
business cycles are in part driven by this kind of
disturbance, then investment good prices could be
countercyclical.
Evaluating the theories
Beyond the work of Greenwood et al. (1997), little
has been done to evaluate the plausibility of the capital-
embodied technological change theory of the trend evi-
dence on investment prices. However, more work has
been done to evaluate the differing views on the cycli-
cality of investment good prices.
Generally, the empirical evidence seems to go
against the increasing returns interpretation of the cycli-
cal evidence on prices. Harrison (1998) examines annual
data on capital, labor, and value added in various indus-
tries in the consumption good sector and the invest-
ment good sector. She finds some empirical support
for increasing returns associated with capital and la-
bor in the production of investment goods. However,
she does not find a sufficient degree of increasing re-
turns to generate increasing returns in the factor of
production, labor, that is variable in the short run. Con-
sequently, the work does not support the increasing
returns view. Other research on measuring increasing
returns focuses on the manufacturing sector. Basu and
Fernald (1997), Burnside (1996), and Burnside, Eichen-
baum, and Rebelo (1995) have overturned previous
empirical claims of increasing returns in the manufac-
turing sector, including capital equipment industries.
Other empirical work attempts to address a key
implication of the increasing returns viewthat the
supply curve for investment goods slopes down.
That is, holding other things constant, the cost of
investment goods is diminishing in the quantity of
investment goods produced. Shea (1993), in a study
of many sectors of the economy, uses instrumental
variables econometric techniques to distinguish supply
shocks from demand shocks to trace out the slope of
supply curves. The authors main conclusion is that,
broadly speaking, supply curves slope up. Goolsbee
(1998) focuses specifically on the supply of capital
goods and uses a series of natural experiments
(involving periodic changes in federal laws providing
for investment tax credits) to identify a disturbance
that affects the demand for investment goods but
not the supply. He finds clear evidence of an upward
sloping investment supply curve. To summarize,
empirical work on the sign of the slope of the invest-
ment good supply schedule finds that it is positive.
Other research assesses the plausibility of the
embodied technology view. Christiano and Fisher
(1998) and Greenwood et al. (1998) evaluate business
cycle models in which a major driving force for fluc-
tuations is variations in capital-embodied technical
change. They test the embodied technology view by
examining the ability of their models to account for
various business cycle phenomena. Both studies find
that their models do about as well as other business
cycle models in accounting for business cycle phenom-
ena. As a measure of the importance of capital-embod-
ied technical change as a driving force for business
cycles, Greenwood et al. (1998) find that about 30 per-
cent of business cycle variation in output can be attrib-
uted to this kind of shock. Christiano and Fisher (1998),
in a very different model, find that about three-quarters
of output fluctuations are due to this shock. Either
way, the evidence suggests that variation in the rate
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of technical change embodied in capital equipment
accounts for a significant proportion of business
cycle variation in output.
New evidence
Some new research attempts to distinguish the
increasing returns view from the embodied technology
view of the cyclical behavior of investment good prices.
This evidence is based on two econometric procedures
designed to identify disturbances to the aggregate
economy that influence the demand for investment
goods, but leave supply unchanged. The specific
shocks considered are an exogenous increase in gov-
ernment purchases (that is an increase in government
purchases that is unrelated to developments in the
economy) and an exogenous monetary contraction.
In the government spending case, the idea is to
investigate how particular investment quantities and
prices respond to an exogenous increase in government
purchases. The exogenous increase in government
spending takes the form of a large military buildup
(specifically the Korean war, the Vietnam war, and the
CarterReagan buildup.) The methodology is identical
to that employed by Eichenbaum and Fisher (1998).18
Figure 12 displays the estimates, which are based on
quarterly data for 1947:Q198:Q3. The first row of fig-
ure 12 plots the response to an exogenous increase in
government purchases of real investment in PDE and
RSE (solid lines) along with a 68 percent confidence
band (colored lines). The second row plots the corre-
sponding relative price responses. Interestingly, PDE
investment rises and RSE investment falls.19 Under
the increasing returns view, we would expect the PDE
price to fall and the RSE price to rise. The second row
of plots indicates that the RSE price response is incon-
sistent with the increasing returns view, while the PDE
price response seems to confirm it.
The monetary shocks case examines how quanti-
ties and prices of PDE and RSE respond to an estimate
of a contractionary monetary disturbance. The meth-
odology is standard20 and has been summarized by
Christiano (1996) (see also Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans, 1999). The estimated responses (along
with a 95 percent confidence interval) are presented
in figure 13. Looking at the quantities in the first row
of plots, notice that both PDE and RSE fall after an
FIGURE 12
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exogenous monetary contraction. Under the increasing
returns view, one would expect the prices of both
investment goods to rise. Studying the second row
of plots, we see that the PDE price response is not
significantly different from zero and the RSE price
drops significantly.
Taken together, the evidence on the responses
of RSE prices and quantities to government spending
and monetary shocks goes against the increasing
returns view. It conforms to a standard neoclassical
view of investment, in the sense that it is consistent
with the discussion of the production possibilities
frontier in figure 8. Of course, the increasing returns
view is really intended to apply to PDE investment.
The responses of PDE prices and quantities provide
mixed signals. The responses to a monetary shock
provide evidence neither for nor against increasing
returns, since the quantity falls but the price response
is not very precisely estimated and could be either
positive, negative, or zero. The responses to a gov-
ernment spending shock might be viewed as evidence
in favor of increasing returns. However, one interpre-
tation of the PDE price response in this case is that it
is dominated by the Korean war military buildup. This
occurred just after World War II, when military spend-
ing had fallen from very high levels. The increasing
returns that could support a lower price with higher
investment might conceivably be due to the resump-
tion of large-scale production at facilities that had
been operating far below minimum efficient scale. If
this is true, it seems more like a special case than an
enduring feature of the U.S. economy.
Conclusion
In this article, I have presented evidence on trends
and business cycle variation in the prices of invest-
ment goods relative to nondurables and services
consumption. This evidence seems to go against
conventional views of both business cycles and
growth. How can one reconcile theory with the evi-
dence? The leading views include one based on
increasing returns to scale in the production of invest-
ment goods and another based on capital-embodied
technical change. While some of the evidence I pre-
sented could be viewed as supporting the increasing
returns view, generally, there is little empirical support
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for increasing returns. At this point, then, the leading
candidate to reconcile theory with the data appears
to be the one based on capital-embodied technical
change, that is, the embodied technology view.
This conclusion has implications for our under-
standing of growth and business cycles, future research
on these subjects, and policy. The prospect of a com-
prehensive theory of growth and business cycles is
appealing because of its simplicity. Disembodied tech-
nical change has gained credence for its supposed
ability to account for growth and business cycles. Yet,
the theory of business cycles based on disembodied
technology has always been problematic because the
shocks are hard to interpret. The growth accounting
results of Greenwood et al. (1997) bring into question
the growth implications of this theory as well. In the
search for a comprehensive theory of growth and
business cycles, then, advances in capital-embodied
technology seem to offer a promising alternative. In
addition, they provide a much more tangible notion of
growth. These considerations suggest that future
research on growth and business cycles that empha-
sizes capital-embodied technical change may be fruitful.
If growth and business cycles are originating from
changes in capital-embodied technology, then the mod-
els we use for policy analysis have to incorporate this
and, consequently, policy recommendations could
change. To the extent that technological change is em-
bodied in capital equipment, government policies that
affect equipment investment could have a dual impact
on growth via the quality and the quantity of capital
goods. This could mean, for example, that investment
tax credits directed toward improvements in the effi-
ciency of capital equipment could have a significant
impact on growth. More research is required to uncover
the full implications of this.
The implications for stabilization policy of the
embodied technology view are less obvious. The fact
that it seems to supplant the increasing returns view
means that the arguments for interventionist stabili-
zation policy that this view supports are less compel-
ling. For example, increasing returns could provide
scope for policy intervention, because it either involves
externalities or is inconsistent with perfect competition.
Moreover, it makes animal spirits models more plausi-
ble, which also has implications for stabilization policy
(see, for example, Christiano and Harrison, 1999). The
embodied technology view is more in line with the real
business cycle tradition, in which policy interventions
are counterproductive. Real business cycle theory says
that the business cycle is largely the result of optimal
behavior by individuals in the economy interacting,
for the most part, in perfectly competitive markets. Any
policy interventions in such an environment tend to
reduce overall welfare. To the extent that the embodied
technology view is more compelling than previous in-
carnations of real business cycle models, it lends
greater support to the argument that interventionist
stabilization policy cannot improve the well-being of
any individual in the U.S. economy without hurting
some other individual. Of course, this still leaves
open the possibility that equity considerations might
be used to defend interventionist stabilization policy.
NOTES
1Equivalently, higher quality goods of all kinds can be produced with
the same amount of capital and labor. As described in more detail below,
new models of endogenous growth have reduced forms, which have sim-
ilar implications for growth accounting to those of models written in
terms of exogenous disembodied technical change.
2Examples of textbooks that emphasize the ISLM model are Abel and
Bernanke (1997), Gordon (1998), Hall and Taylor (1997), and Mankiw
(1997).
3For a survey of theories based on animal spirits, see Farmer (1993).
4A good summary of this view is Prescott (1986). For a discussion of
how this view can be used to explain the 199091 recession, see Hansen
and Prescott (1993).
5This section relies heavily on Christiano and Fitzgerald (1998,
pp. 5859).
6This is the empirical counterpart to investment as it is usually defined
in the real business cycle literature.
7The aggregation in this table is identical to the aggregation used by the
BEA, except for residential, which is calculated as the chain-weighted
aggregate of residential structures and equipment and consumer du-
rable. See box 1 for the chain-weighting procedure.
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the real shares are qt
i/qt
TPI.
9In the notation used above, the black lines are (the natural logarithm of)
pt
i for i corresponding to the 20 types of investment listed in table 1 over
the period for which data are available.
10Many of the trends evident in figure 2 are not apparent in the NIPA
fixed-weighted constant 1982 dollar and earlier NIPA data. In a very
influential book, Gordon (1989) argued that the conventional BEA treat-
ment of investment good quality severely underestimated the degree of
quality change in investment goods. His analysis was the first to show
that there is a substantial downward trend in the prices of PDE and CD.
The BEA now incorporates many of the adjustments for quality change
advocated by Gordon (1989).
11The procedure used to extract the business cycle component of the rela-
tive price data involves the application of a linear filter. This, combined
with the fact that this filter is applied to the natural logarithm of the rela-
tive prices, implies that the business cycle component of each relative
price is the business cycle component of the relevant investment deflator
minus the business cycle component of the consumption deflator.55 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
of model if the share of labor in production is greater in the consumption
sector than in the investment goods sector. As long as factors of produc-
tion are perfectly mobile across sectors (that is, there are no costs to
shifting factors across sectors), an increase in technology lowers the
price of investment goods in this case. Factor shares are difficult to mea-
sure, so assessing the plausibility of this possibility is difficult. Howev-
er, the Greenwood et al. (1997) results for long-run trends suggest that
the differences in factor shares required to reconcile the empirical evi-
dence on prices with this explanation may be implausible. Also, it is
implausible to assume that there are no costs of shifting factors of pro-
duction across sectors.
17This frontier does not necessarily reflect true technological possibili-
ties, but takes into account the restrictions on individual decisionmak-
ing, such as individuals not internalizing a production externality, such
that the points on the frontier are consistent with optimizing behavior
of producers.
18The methodology is identical to that employed by Eichenbaum and
Fisher (1998). This methodology uses four variables, in addition to the
investment good quantity and price variables, in a vector autoregres-
sion, along with a dummy variable which takes on the value zero at all
dates except 1950:Q3, 1965:Q1 and 1980:Q1, in which cases the vari-
able equals unity. These dates correspond to the beginning of three large
military buildups. The key identifying assumption is that these build-
ups were exogenous events. For further discussion, see Edelberg,
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999). The four variables are the log level of
time t real GDP, the net three-month Treasury bill rate, the log of the
Producer Price Index of crude fuel, and the log level of real defense pur-
chases, g
t. Six lags were used. The plotted responses in figure 12 corre-
spond to the average response of the indicated variable across the three
military buildup episodes, taking into account the endogenous varia-
tion in the variable.
19See Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) for a discussion of how
this evidence can be explained within the context of a standard neoclas-
sical model.
20Technically, I estimate a vector autoregression in the deflator for non-
durables and services, real GDP, an index of changes in sensitive materi-
als prices, the federal funds rate, plus the investment price and quantity I
am interested in. All variables except the federal funds rate are first
logged. The impulse response functions in figure 13 correspond to an
orthoganalized innovation in the federal funds rate. The orthoganaliza-
tion procedure assumes the order of the vector autoregression is the same
as listed in the text and a triangular decomposition. Ordering is not im-
portant for the investment responses as long as standard assumptions are
made about the variables that precede the federal funds rate in the order-
ing (see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1999). Finally, the stan-
dard errors are computed using the procedure described by Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999).
12For a comprehensive review of this literature, see Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995).
13The assumption of constant returns to scale is usually based on a repli-
cation argument. A fixed quantity of capital and labor applied to produce
x amount of some good can always be applied again to produce another x
of the good. That is, increasing the quantity of factors of production by
some proportion changes the amount produced by the same proportion.
This argument seems harder to apply in the case of technology. For exam-
ple, suppose a group of researchers have discovered a new process for mak-
ing steel. If another group of researchers make the same discovery, there
is no net improvement in knowledge. In this case, there would be de-
creasing returns. On the other hand, fixed costs or advantages to having
many researchers working on similar projects may mean that increasing
returns to scale are important in the process of knowledge creation.
14Greenwood et al. (1997) show how the research and development and
human capital classes of models can be used to account for the evidence,
if these activities have a disproportionate impact on the production of
equipment compared with consumption goods. Two explanations they
consider differ fundamentally from their basic story. They both involve a
two-sector interpretation of the evidence, in which equipment and con-
sumption goods are produced in separate sectors (using separate produc-
tion functions). In one case, the production functions have different factor
shares, that is, the different goods require capital and labor in different
proportions to produce a unit of the good. The authors conclude that the
prospect for explaining the relative price decline with a two-sector
model based on differences in share parameters looks bleak, given the
implausibly large differences required in the structure of production
across sectors (p. 358). The other explanation involves an externality
in the production of investment goods. Specifically, the productivity of
factors in the investment good sector is increasing in the quantity of in-
vestment goods along the lines described in Romer (1986). Greenwood
et al. (1997) show that this explanation can, in principle, account for the
trend evidence. However, this theory relies on an externality which is
difficult to identify empirically. Some evidence on increasing returns to
scale, which the production externality implies, is discussed below.
Generally, there is little empirical support for this view.
15The shape of the frontier can be justified by standard neoclassical assump-
tions about how goods are produced, in particular that they are produced
using constant returns to scale production functions in labor and capital
and that it is costly to transfer labor and/or capital across sectors produc-
ing consumption goods and sectors producing investment goods. Note
that adjustment costs in the installation of investment goods affect the rel-
ative price of installed capacity, not the relative price of investment goods.
16This discussion assumes that the shares of factors in production are
identical in producing consumption and investment goods and/or that
there are costs of adjusting factors of production across sectors. It is pos-
sible for the price of investment goods to be countercyclical in this type
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